Equilibrium effects of pay transparency
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Publication:6536558
DOI10.3982/ECTA19788zbMATH Open1541.91131MaRDI QIDQ6536558FDOQ6536558
Authors: Zoë B. Cullen, Bobak Pakzad-Hurson 
Publication date: 13 May 2024
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
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- Equilibrium effects of pay transparency
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