Job search with belated information and wage signalling. A comment

DOI10.1016/0165-1889(90)90013-7zbMATH Open0696.90013OpenAlexW2079447792MaRDI QIDQ911441FDOQ911441

Matthew S. Goldberg, George J. Borjas

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1889(90)90013-7

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zbMATH Keywords

Gittins indexjob-searchbelated informationeconomic interpretationreservation-wage policywage signalling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic programming (90C39) Economic growth models (91B62)

Cites Work

• Job search with related information and wage signalling

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