A model of competitive signaling with rich message spaces

DOI10.1007/S10058-021-00279-YMaRDI QIDQ6156328zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tomas Rodriguez-Barraquer, Xu Tan

Publication date 13 June 2023

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00279-y

zbMATH Keywords

competitionasymmetric informationsignaling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5702692 (Why is no real title available?)
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Job market signaling and employer learning
• Market signaling with grades
• Misinformation
• Persuasion with costly precision
• STRING THEORY, THE CRISIS IN PARTICLE PHYSICS AND THE ASCENT OF METAPHORIC ARGUMENTS
• Sequential Equilibria
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• The optimal choice of pre-launch reviewer

Cited in

(2)

• ``Tell me what you need: signaling with limited resources
• Signalling Victory to Ensure Dominance: A Continuous Model

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