A model of competitive signaling with rich message spaces

DOI10.1007/S10058-021-00279-YzbMATH Open1518.91025OpenAlexW4210401085MaRDI QIDQ6156328FDOQ6156328

Authors: Tomas Rodriguez-Barraquer, Xu Tan 

Publication date: 13 June 2023

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00279-y

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zbMATH Keywords

competitionasymmetric informationsignaling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Sequential Equilibria
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• The optimal choice of pre-launch reviewer
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Market signaling with grades
• Job market signaling and employer learning
• MISINFORMATION*
• Persuasion with costly precision
• STRING THEORY, THE CRISIS IN PARTICLE PHYSICS AND THE ASCENT OF METAPHORIC ARGUMENTS

Cited In (2)

• Signalling Victory to Ensure Dominance: A Continuous Model
• ``Tell me what you need: signaling with limited resources

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