MISINFORMATION*
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4620070
DOI10.1111/j.1468-2354.2012.00732.xzbMath1420.91400OpenAlexW4254787265MaRDI QIDQ4620070
Publication date: 7 February 2019
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2012.00732.x
Related Items
Market signaling with grades ⋮ A model of competitive signaling with rich message spaces ⋮ On the value of persuasion by experts ⋮ Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender ⋮ Test design under voluntary participation ⋮ Persuasion with costly precision
This page was built for publication: MISINFORMATION*