Education signalling and uncertainty (Q2739366)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1643861
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| English | Education signalling and uncertainty |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1643861 |
Statements
9 September 2001
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signalling
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Dempster-Shafer equilibrium
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Bayes perfect equilibrium
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Education signalling and uncertainty (English)
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This paper applies a new concept, Dempster-Shafer equilibrium, to signalling games. In particular, a finite version of the Spence signalling game, which has many Bayes perfect equilibria, has a unique Dempster-Shafer equilibrium. The latter corresponds to one of the former. It is known that the Dempster-Shafer equilibrium violate the crucial property of belief persistence, and so further work is needed on this concept.NEWLINENEWLINEFor the entire collection see [Zbl 0958.00049].
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0.8070371150970459
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0.7856290340423584
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0.7754966616630554
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0.7745621204376221
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