Strategic dropouts

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2004.10.006MaRDI QIDQ1779840zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ram Orzach, Yair Tauman

Publication date 1 June 2005

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.006

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriumeducation signaling modelgifted entrepreneurs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Education signaling with uncertain return
• Education Signalling with Preemptive Offers
• Signal-extracting education in an overlapping generations model
• Signaling and optimal sorting
• Signalling to Experts

Cites work

• Education Signalling with Preemptive Offers
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Signalling Reversal

Cited in

(3)

• Information acquisition and disclosure by firms in the presence of additional available information
• False modesty: when disclosing good news looks bad
• University dropout problems and solutions

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