General equilibrium in markets for lemons
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Cites work
- A Walrasian Theory of Markets with Adverse Selection
- Competitive Pooling: Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered
- Competitive equilibria with asymmetric information
- Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium1
- Equilibria and Pareto optimal of markets with adverse selection
- General Competitive Analysis in an Economy with Private Information
- General equilibrium in economies with adverse selection
- Infinite dimensional analysis. A hitchhiker's guide.
- Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
- Prudent expectations equilibrium in economies with uncertain delivery
- Subjective expectations equilibrium in economies with uncertain delivery
Cited in
(9)- Irrelevance of private information in two-period economies with more goods than states of nature
- Cycles and multiple equilibria in the market for durable lemons
- General equilibrium model for an asymmetric information economy without delivery upper bounds
- Equilibrium information in credence goods
- Competitive markets with private information on both sides
- Nonexclusive competition in the market for lemons
- Two-period economies with price-contingent deliveries
- Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons
- General equilibrium with information sales
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