Analysis of signal game for supply chain finance (SCF) of MSEs and banks based on incomplete information model

DOI10.1155/2019/3646097MaRDI QIDQ2296491zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Zhang Tao, Xinquan Liu, Nana Feng, Xin Li

Publication date 18 February 2020

Published in Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1155/2019/3646097

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Financial networks (including contagion, systemic risk, regulation) (91G45)

Review text

Summary: The signal gaming model based on incomplete information is used to analyze the decisions of commercial banks and medium-sized and small enterprises (SMEs) in supply chain finance business. It is found that the returns of banks are closely relied on the probability of good SMEs join which is proportional to \(\varTheta \) (the probability of ``good SMEs in the market) and \(p\) (the probability of ``good SMEs chosen to join the supply chain finance) in supply chain finance business, and the default cost is an important constrain for determining the strategies adopted by the SMEs and the banks. To achieve higher returns, SMEs and banks should make effects to create a better supply chain finance business environment to achieve the separation equilibrium.

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Cites work

• A game theory approach in seller-buyer supply chain
• Evolutionary Games in Economics
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
• Tactical berth allocation under uncertainty

Cited in

(1)

• Optimal operation and financing decisions in green supply chain with a capital-constrained manufacturer

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