Analysis of signal game for supply chain finance (SCF) of MSEs and banks based on incomplete information model

DOI10.1155/2019/3646097zbMATH Open1453.91105OpenAlexW2973021875WikidataQ128205083 ScholiaQ128205083MaRDI QIDQ2296491FDOQ2296491

Authors: Zhang Tao, Xinquan Liu, Nana Feng, Xin Li 

Publication date: 18 February 2020

Published in: Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2019/3646097

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Financial networks (including contagion, systemic risk, regulation) (91G45)

Cites Work

• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Evolutionary Games in Economics
• A game theory approach in seller-buyer supply chain
• Tactical berth allocation under uncertainty
• Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis

Cited In (1)

• Optimal operation and financing decisions in green supply chain with a capital-constrained manufacturer

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