Lender learning and entry under general demand uncertainty

DOI10.1007/S10058-011-0108-0zbMATH Open1213.91100OpenAlexW2084942866MaRDI QIDQ540602FDOQ540602

Authors: Neelam Jain, Leonard J. Mirman 

Publication date: 3 June 2011

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/5751/1/entrygen3.pdf

Recommendations

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zbMATH Keywords

informationlearningentrycontracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

Cites Work

• Monopoly Experimentation
• Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
• Dynamic duopoly with learning through market experimentation
• Strategic experimentation in financial intermediation with threat of entry
• Entry detererrence under financial intermediation with private information and hidden contracts
• Information and experimentation in short-term contracting
• The simple analytics of information and experimentation in dynamic agency

Cited In (1)

• Strategic experimentation in financial intermediation with threat of entry

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