Optimal entry timing

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.03.002MaRDI QIDQ894062zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Aaron M. Kolb

Publication date 23 November 2015

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.002

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian learningcontinuous timedynamic gamesinformation economicsmarket entryoptimal stopping

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stopping times; optimal stopping problems; gambling theory (60G40) 2-person games (91A05) Dynamic games (91A25)

Recommendations

• Entry and vertical differentiation
• Hiding and herding in market entry
• Real options and signaling in strategic investment games
• Optimal firm growth under the threat of entry
• Learning and collusion in new markets with uncertain entry costs

Cites work

• Competitive experimentation with private information: the survivor's curse
• Continuous-Time Dynkin Games with Mixed Strategies
• Durable goods monopoly with stochastic costs
• Entry and vertical differentiation
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Good signals gone bad: dynamic signalling with switched effort levels
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3296964 (Why is no real title available?)
• Learning and information aggregation in an exit game
• Market Structure and Innovation
• On a Markov game with one-sided information
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• Reputation in continuous-time games
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• The war of information
• Time-on-the-Market as a Sign of Quality
• Waiting for news in the market for lemons

Cited in

(11)

• Dynamic quality signaling with hidden actions
• Entry and vertical differentiation
• Overconfidence and timing of entry
• Strategic real options
• Try before you buy: a theory of dynamic information acquisition
• Hiding and herding in market entry
• Optimal entry timing in markets with social influence
• Reducing information asymmetries in market entry decisions
• Optimism and timing of market entry: how beliefs and information distortion create market leadership
• Signalling with private monitoring
• Timing of entry under externalities

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