Optimal firm growth under the threat of entry
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Publication:319757
DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2015.04.030zbMATH Open1346.91145OpenAlexW2019495088WikidataQ41872636 ScholiaQ41872636MaRDI QIDQ319757FDOQ319757
Authors: Peter M. Kort, Stefan Wrzaczek 
Publication date: 6 October 2016
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.04.030
Recommendations
- Entry deterrence by timing rather than overinvestment in a strategic real options framework
- Investment flexibility as a barrier to entry
- Entry-Deterrence in Stackelberg Perfect Equilibria
- A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs
- Uncertainty and entry deterrence
Dynamic programming (90C39) Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Cites Work
- Strategic incentives in dynamic duopoly
- A survey of dynamical games in economics.
- Capacity Investment, Preemption and Commitment in an Infinite Horizon Model
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Capital accumulation games of infinite duration
- Dynamic oligopoly with capacity adjustment costs
- Dynamic duopoly with adjustment costs: A differential game approach
- Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility
- Uncertainty and entry deterrence
- The Leitmann-Schmitendorf advertising game with \(n\) players and time discounting
- Anticipation in innovative investment under oligopolistic competition
Cited In (16)
- On a class of hybrid differential games
- Zeno points in optimal control models with endogenous regime switching
- Optimal entry timing
- Financial intermediation and entry-deterrence
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Corruption, market quality, and entry deterrence in emerging economies
- Entry deterrence by timing rather than overinvestment in a strategic real options framework
- Strategic experimentation in financial intermediation with threat of entry
- Entry and growth in a perfectly competitive vintage model
- Pricing and entry strategies for competitive firms with optimistic entrant
- Entry-Deterrence in Stackelberg Perfect Equilibria
- Opening the source code: the threat of forking
- Investment flexibility as a barrier to entry
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Advertising a product to face a competitor entry: a differential game approach
- Delaying or deterring entry. A game-theoretic analysis
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