Optimal firm growth under the threat of entry

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2015.04.030MaRDI QIDQ319757zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Peter M. Kort, Stefan Wrzaczek

Publication date 6 October 2016

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.04.030

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic programminggame theoryeconomics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic programming (90C39) Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1734466 (Why is no real title available?)
• A survey of dynamical games in economics.
• Anticipation in innovative investment under oligopolistic competition
• Capacity Investment, Preemption and Commitment in an Infinite Horizon Model
• Capital accumulation games of infinite duration
• Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility
• Dynamic duopoly with adjustment costs: A differential game approach
• Dynamic oligopoly with capacity adjustment costs
• Strategic incentives in dynamic duopoly
• The Leitmann-Schmitendorf advertising game with \(n\) players and time discounting
• Uncertainty and entry deterrence

Cited in

(16)

• Delaying or deterring entry. A game-theoretic analysis
• On a class of hybrid differential games
• Zeno points in optimal control models with endogenous regime switching
• Optimal entry timing
• Financial intermediation and entry-deterrence
• Entry deterrence by timing rather than overinvestment in a strategic real options framework
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7271747 (Why is no real title available?)
• Corruption, market quality, and entry deterrence in emerging economies
• Strategic experimentation in financial intermediation with threat of entry
• Entry and growth in a perfectly competitive vintage model
• Pricing and entry strategies for competitive firms with optimistic entrant
• Entry-Deterrence in Stackelberg Perfect Equilibria
• Investment flexibility as a barrier to entry
• Opening the source code: the threat of forking
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7500545 (Why is no real title available?)
• Advertising a product to face a competitor entry: a differential game approach

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