Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility
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Publication:1055331
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(83)90075-3zbMATH Open0521.90025OpenAlexW2025427504MaRDI QIDQ1055331FDOQ1055331
Publication date: 1983
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90075-3
discountingstrategic investmentexistence of a set of perfect equilibriamarket entrancemobility deterrenceno-discounting
Cites Work
- Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Sequential Equilibria
- Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
- Further properties of nonzero-sum differential games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Equilibrium solutions in dynamic dominant-player models
- Title not available (Why is that?)
Cited In (20)
- Dynamic limit pricing and internal finance
- Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games
- EXCESS CAPACITY IN POST ENTRY COURNOT COMPETITION
- Markov interactions in a class of dynamic games
- The tragedy of the commons?
- The joint exploitation of a productive asset: A game-theoretic approach
- Dynamic oligopoly with capacity adjustment costs
- Commitment in alternating offers bargaining
- Incentive compatibility constraints and dynamic programming in continuous time
- Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
- Optimal firm growth under the threat of entry
- Investment dynamics in electricity markets
- On the existence of Nash equilibria in large games
- COMPLEMENTARITY, SUBSTITUTABILITY AND STRATEGIC ACCUMULATION OF CAPITAL
- STRATEGIC INVESTMENT IN A NEW MIXED MARKET WITH LABOR‐MANAGED AND PROFIT‐MAXIMIZING FIRMS
- Incentive contract design for supplier switching with considering learning effect
- Nonuniqueness of no-memory feedback equilibria in a fishery resource game
- Capital accumulation, asset values and imperfect product market competition
- Endogenous Stackelberg leadership
- Advertising in a differential oligopoly game
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