Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(83)90075-3zbMath0521.90025OpenAlexW2025427504MaRDI QIDQ1055331

Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole

Publication date: 1983

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90075-3

zbMATH Keywords

discountingstrategic investmentexistence of a set of perfect equilibriamarket entrancemobility deterrenceno-discounting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Related Items (20)

Dynamic limit pricing and internal finance ⋮ The joint exploitation of a productive asset: A game-theoretic approach ⋮ EXCESS CAPACITY IN POST ENTRY COURNOT COMPETITION ⋮ The tragedy of the commons? ⋮ COMPLEMENTARITY, SUBSTITUTABILITY AND STRATEGIC ACCUMULATION OF CAPITAL ⋮ Optimal firm growth under the threat of entry ⋮ Incentive contract design for supplier switching with considering learning effect ⋮ Investment dynamics in electricity markets ⋮ Commitment in alternating offers bargaining ⋮ Advertising in a differential oligopoly game ⋮ Nonuniqueness of no-memory feedback equilibria in a fishery resource game ⋮ STRATEGIC INVESTMENT IN A NEW MIXED MARKET WITH LABOR‐MANAGED AND PROFIT‐MAXIMIZING FIRMS ⋮ Dynamic oligopoly with capacity adjustment costs ⋮ On the existence of Nash equilibria in large games ⋮ Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games ⋮ Markov interactions in a class of dynamic games ⋮ Endogenous Stackelberg leadership ⋮ Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games ⋮ Incentive compatibility constraints and dynamic programming in continuous time ⋮ Capital accumulation, asset values and imperfect product market competition

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Equilibrium solutions in dynamic dominant-player models
• Further properties of nonzero-sum differential games
• Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology
• Sequential Equilibria

This page was built for publication: Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility