Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(83)90075-3MaRDI QIDQ1055331zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole

Publication date 1983

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90075-3

zbMATH Keywords

discountingexistence of a set of perfect equilibriamarket entrancemobility deterrenceno-discountingstrategic investment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Cites work

• Equilibrium solutions in dynamic dominant-player models
• Further properties of nonzero-sum differential games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47943 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3211395 (Why is no real title available?)
• Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Sequential Equilibria
• Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games

Cited in

(21)

• Markov interactions in a class of dynamic games
• Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
• Dynamic limit pricing and internal finance
• Dynamic oligopoly with capacity adjustment costs
• Endogenous Stackelberg leadership
• The joint exploitation of a productive asset: A game-theoretic approach
• The tragedy of the commons?
• Advertising in a differential oligopoly game
• Incentive compatibility constraints and dynamic programming in continuous time
• Incentive contract design for supplier switching with considering learning effect
• Optimal firm growth under the threat of entry
• Capital accumulation, asset values and imperfect product market competition
• STRATEGIC INVESTMENT IN A NEW MIXED MARKET WITH LABOR‐MANAGED AND PROFIT‐MAXIMIZING FIRMS
• EXCESS CAPACITY IN POST ENTRY COURNOT COMPETITION
• COMPLEMENTARITY, SUBSTITUTABILITY AND STRATEGIC ACCUMULATION OF CAPITAL
• Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games
• On the existence of Nash equilibria in large games
• Investment dynamics in electricity markets
• Subsidizing a new technology: an impulse Stackelberg game approach
• Commitment in alternating offers bargaining
• Nonuniqueness of no-memory feedback equilibria in a fishery resource game

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