EXCESS CAPACITY IN POST ENTRY COURNOT COMPETITION

DOI10.1142/S0219198902000586zbMATH Open1090.91572MaRDI QIDQ4797296FDOQ4797296

Jacques Thépot

Publication date: 2002

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Recommendations

• Capacity precommitment and price competition yield the Cournot outcome
• Cournot duopoly when the competitors operate under capacity constraints
• Excess Capacity and Collusion
• Cartels, Profits and Excess Capacity
• Efficiency and surplus bounds in Cournot competition.
• Price Stackelberg competition and capacity constraints
• Competitive capacity expansion under demand uncertainty
• Price competition in a capacity-constrained duopoly
• Bertrand competition with non-rigid capacity constraints

zbMATH Keywords

excess capacityDynamics duopoly

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Economic growth models (91B62)

Cites Work

• Capacity Investment, Preemption and Commitment in an Infinite Horizon Model
• Capital accumulation games of infinite duration
• Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility
• Bertrand oligopoly with decreasing returns to scale
• Dynamic limit pricing, barriers to entry, and rational firms

Cited In (3)

• Excess entry in the absence of scale economies
• Developments in differential game theory and numerical methods: Economic and management applications
• Excess Capacity and Collusion

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