EXCESS CAPACITY IN POST ENTRY COURNOT COMPETITION

DOI10.1142/S0219198902000586MaRDI QIDQ4797296zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Jacques Thépot

Publication date 2002

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

excess capacityDynamics duopoly

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Economic growth models (91B62)

Recommendations

• Capacity precommitment and price competition yield the Cournot outcome
• Cournot duopoly when the competitors operate under capacity constraints
• Excess Capacity and Collusion
• Cartels, Profits and Excess Capacity
• Efficiency and surplus bounds in Cournot competition.
• Price Stackelberg competition and capacity constraints
• Competitive capacity expansion under demand uncertainty
• Price competition in a capacity-constrained duopoly
• Bertrand competition with non-rigid capacity constraints

Cites work

• Bertrand oligopoly with decreasing returns to scale
• Capacity Investment, Preemption and Commitment in an Infinite Horizon Model
• Capital accumulation games of infinite duration
• Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility
• Dynamic limit pricing, barriers to entry, and rational firms

Cited in

(4)

• Excess Capacity and Collusion
• Developments in differential game theory and numerical methods: Economic and management applications
• Excess capacity and effectiveness of policy interventions: evidence from the cement industry
• Excess entry in the absence of scale economies

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