Endogeneity of alternating offers in a bargaining game

DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.2225zbMath0872.90124OpenAlexW2009092337MaRDI QIDQ1357586

Thomas R. Palfrey, Richard D. McKelvey

Publication date: 15 October 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2225

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationunique Nash equilibriumdiscounted payoffsconcession gameinfinite horizon two-person simultaneous move bargaining game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (2)

Folk theorems in a bargaining game with endogenous protocol ⋮ Emergence and nonemergence of alternating offers in bilateral bargaining

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one- sided incomplete information
• The war of attrition with incomplete information
• A non-cooperative bargaining model with strategically timed offers
• Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information
• A Sequential Concession Game with Asymmetric Information
• The War of Attrition in Continuous Time with Complete Information
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty
• Bargaining with Two-sided Incomplete Information: An Infinite Horizon Model with Alternating Offers

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