A direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one- sided incomplete information
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Publication:912008
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90118-XzbMath0697.90093MaRDI QIDQ912008
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Raymond J. Deneckere
Publication date: 1989
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
91A12: Cooperative games
91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)
91B62: Economic growth models
91A40: Other game-theoretic models
91A20: Multistage and repeated games
Related Items
Sequential bargaining, external effects of agreement, and public intervention, The role of commitment in bilateral trade, Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights, Sequential bargaining with common values, Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation, Efficient allocation with continuous quantities, Endogeneity of alternating offers in a bargaining game, Bilateral trading and incomplete information: price convergence in a small market, Equity bargaining with common value, Incomplete information about social preferences explains equal division and delay in bargaining
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- Strategic Delay in Bargaining
- Bargaining Under Two-Sided Incomplete Information: The Unrestricted Offers Case
- Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
