Power or loss aversion? Reinterpreting the bargaining weights in search and matching models

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2012.11.034zbMATH Open1268.91075OpenAlexW2041118577WikidataQ105667243 ScholiaQ105667243MaRDI QIDQ356609FDOQ356609

Francesco Giuli, Enrico Marchetti, Giuseppe Ciccarone

Publication date: 26 July 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.11.034

zbMATH Keywords

loss aversionsearch and matchingNash bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty
• Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment
• Loss aversion and bargaining

Cited In (1)

• Search frictions and labor market dynamics in a real business cycle model with undeclared work

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