Endogenous reference points in bargaining
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Publication:1616837
DOI10.1007/s00186-018-0636-2zbMath1418.91221OpenAlexW2799723470MaRDI QIDQ1616837
Emin Karagözoğlu, Kerim Keskin
Publication date: 7 November 2018
Published in: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11693/50250
Cooperative games (91A12) Utility theory (91B16) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (4)
Bargaining, reference points, and limited influence ⋮ Expected utility versus cumulative prospect theory in an evolutionary model of bargaining ⋮ A tale of two bargaining solutions ⋮ On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results
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