On the influence of hard leverage in a soft leverage bargaining game: the importance of credible claims
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3614533 (Why is no real title available?)
- Approaches to the Bargaining Problem Before and After the Theory of Games: A Critical Discussion of Zeuthen's, Hicks', and Nash's Theories
- Axiomatic models of bargaining
- Bargaining with a residual claimant: an experimental study
- Dividing justly in bargaining problems with claims
- Estimating the influence of fairness on bargaining behavior
- Fairness motivation in bargaining: a matter of principle
- Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic
- Learning to accept in ultimatum games: Evidence from an experimental design that generates low offers
- Monotonicity of bargaining solutions with respect to the disagreement point
- Moral property rights in bargaining with infeasible claims
- Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games
- The bargaining problem
- Ultimatum salary bargaining with real effort
Cited in
(9)- Bargaining, reference points, and limited influence
- Endogenous reference points in bargaining
- Between anchors and aspirations: a new family of bargaining solutions
- Asymmetric outside options in ultimatum bargaining: a systematic analysis
- Responding to (un)reasonable requests by an authority
- Focal points and bargaining in housing markets
- Driving a hard bargain is a balancing act: how social preferences constrain the negotiation process
- Bargaining with a residual claimant: an experimental study
- Effect of reduced opportunities on bargaining outcomes: an experiment with status asymmetries
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