Focal points and bargaining in housing markets
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3006370 (Why is no real title available?)
- Approaches to the Bargaining Problem Before and After the Theory of Games: A Critical Discussion of Zeuthen's, Hicks', and Nash's Theories
- Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data from Sequential Games
- DO “CAPITALIZATION EFFECTS” FOR PUBLIC GOODS REVEAL THE PUBLIC'S WILLINGNESS TO PAY?
- Focal points in pure coordination games: An experimental investigation
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
- Loss aversion and seller behavior: Evidence from the housing market
- Negotiation Analysis: A Characterization and Review
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Rationalizing focal points
- Social image and the 50-50 norm: a theoretical and experimental analysis of audience effects
- The Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study
- The bargaining problem
- Two-Person Cooperative Games
- Why are so many goods priced to end in nine? And why this practice hurts the producers
Cited in
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