Focal points and bargaining in housing markets
From MaRDI portal
Publication:495661
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.07.002zbMath1347.91161OpenAlexW1074932569MaRDI QIDQ495661
Devin G. Pope, Jaren C. Pope, Justin R. Sydnor
Publication date: 15 September 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.07.002
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Focal points in pure coordination games: An experimental investigation
- Why are so many goods priced to end in nine? And why this practice hurts the producers
- Loss Aversion and Seller Behavior: Evidence from the Housing Market
- DO “CAPITALIZATION EFFECTS” FOR PUBLIC GOODS REVEAL THE PUBLIC'S WILLINGNESS TO PAY?
- The Bargaining Problem
- Approaches to the Bargaining Problem Before and After the Theory of Games: A Critical Discussion of Zeuthen's, Hicks', and Nash's Theories
- Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- The Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study
- Negotiation Analysis: A Characterization and Review
- Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data from Sequential Games
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
- Two-Person Cooperative Games
- Rationalizing focal points
This page was built for publication: Focal points and bargaining in housing markets
