Focal points and bargaining in housing markets

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.07.002zbMath1347.91161MaRDI QIDQ495661

Devin G. Pope, Jaren C. Pope, Justin R. Sydnor

Publication date: 15 September 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.07.002

zbMATH Keywords

bargaining; focal points; housing prices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Rationalizing focal points