Bargaining with a residual claimant: an experimental study
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.12.005zbMATH Open1458.91100OpenAlexW3123383200MaRDI QIDQ1995491FDOQ1995491
Kyle Hyndman, Matthew Embrey, Arno Riedl
Publication date: 23 February 2021
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/b98f3188-6ee7-4990-b12c-8db2d2ae10d5
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Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)
Cites Work
- The Bargaining Problem
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- Risk and Rationality: Uncovering Heterogeneity in Probability Distortion
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- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Moral Property Rights in Bargaining with Infeasible Claims
- On the influence of hard leverage in a soft leverage bargaining game: the importance of credible claims
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Fairness motivation in bargaining: a matter of principle
- Risk Aversion and Nash's Solution for Bargaining Games with Risky Outcomes
- Small- and large-stakes risk aversion: Implications of concavity calibration for decision theory
- Higher Order Risk Attitudes, Demographics, and Financial Decisions
- Experimental results on ultimatum games with incomplete information
- The effects of beliefs versus risk attitude on bargaining outcomes
- Prudence in bargaining: The effect of uncertainty on bargaining outcomes
Cited In (1)
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