Bargaining with a residual claimant: an experimental study

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.12.005zbMATH Open1458.91100OpenAlexW3123383200MaRDI QIDQ1995491FDOQ1995491

Authors: Matthew Embrey, Kyle Hyndman, Arno Riedl 

Publication date: 23 February 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/b98f3188-6ee7-4990-b12c-8db2d2ae10d5

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zbMATH Keywords

bargainingreference pointsex-post risk

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)

Cites Work

• The bargaining problem
• The allocation of inventory risk in a supply chain: push, pull, and advance-purchase discount contracts
• Risk and rationality: uncovering heterogeneity in probability distortion
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Moral property rights in bargaining with infeasible claims
• On the influence of hard leverage in a soft leverage bargaining game: the importance of credible claims
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Fairness motivation in bargaining: a matter of principle
• Risk Aversion and Nash's Solution for Bargaining Games with Risky Outcomes
• Small- and large-stakes risk aversion: Implications of concavity calibration for decision theory
• Higher order risk attitudes, demographics, and financial decisions
• Experimental results on ultimatum games with incomplete information
• The effects of beliefs versus risk attitude on bargaining outcomes
• Prudence in bargaining: The effect of uncertainty on bargaining outcomes

Cited In (1)

• On the influence of hard leverage in a soft leverage bargaining game: the importance of credible claims

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• ORSEE

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