Between anchors and aspirations: a new family of bargaining solutions

DOI10.1007/s10058-019-00220-4zbMath1429.91174OpenAlexW2929842682MaRDI QIDQ2281444

Elif Özcan-Tok, Emin Karagözoğlu, Kerim Keskin

Publication date: 19 December 2019

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11693/53446

zbMATH Keywords

axiomatic approachreference pointbargaining problemsanchorsaspirationsbargaining solutionsdisagreement point

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Bargaining, reference points, and limited influence ⋮ On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results

Cites Work

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