The Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution with loss aversion

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.10.003zbMath1208.91014OpenAlexW2141807154MaRDI QIDQ631121

Bram Driesen, Andrés Perea, H. J. M. Peters

Publication date: 22 March 2011

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.10.003

zbMATH Keywords

loss aversionbargainingreference dependenceKalai-Smorodinsky solution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Endogenous reference points in bargaining, On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results, Proportional concessions and the leximin solution, Setting Nash Versus Kalai–Smorodinsky Bargaining Approach: Computing the Continuous-Time Controllable Markov Game, Credibilistic loss aversion Nash equilibrium for bimatrix games with triangular fuzzy payoffs

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