The Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution with loss aversion
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Publication:631121
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.10.003zbMath1208.91014OpenAlexW2141807154MaRDI QIDQ631121
Bram Driesen, Andrés Perea, H. J. M. Peters
Publication date: 22 March 2011
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.10.003
Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (5)
Endogenous reference points in bargaining ⋮ On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results ⋮ Proportional concessions and the leximin solution ⋮ Setting Nash Versus Kalai–Smorodinsky Bargaining Approach: Computing the Continuous-Time Controllable Markov Game ⋮ Credibilistic loss aversion Nash equilibrium for bimatrix games with triangular fuzzy payoffs
Cites Work
- An impossibility result concerning \(n\)-person bargaining games
- Concavifiability and constructions of concave utility functions
- The effect of decision weights in bargaining problems.
- Reference-dependent subjective expected utility.
- Loss aversion equilibrium
- An index of loss aversion
- Loss aversion and bargaining
- A preference foundation for constant loss aversion
- Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem
- The Bargaining Problem
- A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences*
- Characterizing the Nash and Raiffa Bargaining Solutions by Disagreement Point Axioms
- Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
- Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
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