Insurance bargaining under ambiguity
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Publication:2015652
DOI10.1016/J.INSMATHECO.2013.10.001zbMATH Open1290.91089OpenAlexW2008012467MaRDI QIDQ2015652FDOQ2015652
Larry Y. Tzeng, Rachel J. Huang, Yi-Chieh Huang
Publication date: 23 June 2014
Published in: Insurance Mathematics \& Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.insmatheco.2013.10.001
Recommendations
Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Cites Work
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Cited In (7)
- Insurance as a lemons market: coverage denials and pooling
- Nash equilibria of over-the-counter bargaining for insurance risk redistributions: the role of a regulator
- Competitive insurance market in the presence of ambiguity
- Construction of a negotiation set for competitive interaction between two insurance companies
- Two-person insurance negotiation
- Insurance pricing under ambiguity
- Optimal insurance design under asymmetric Nash bargaining
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