Insurance bargaining under ambiguity
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Publication:2015652
DOI10.1016/j.insmatheco.2013.10.001zbMath1290.91089OpenAlexW2008012467MaRDI QIDQ2015652
Larry Y. Tzeng, Rachel J. Huang, Yi-Chieh Huang
Publication date: 23 June 2014
Published in: Insurance Mathematics \& Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.insmatheco.2013.10.001
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Cites Work
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