Ambiguity aversion and the propensities for self-insurance and self-protection

DOI10.1007/s11166-010-9112-yzbMath1206.91026MaRDI QIDQ625694

Arthur Snow

Publication date: 25 February 2011

Published in: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11166-010-9112-y

zbMATH Keywords

non-expected utility; second-order probability; greater ambiguity aversion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B06: Decision theory

91B16: Utility theory

Related Items

AN ECONOMIC PREMIUM PRINCIPLE UNDER THE DUAL THEORY OF THE SMOOTH AMBIGUITY MODEL, When Risk Perception Gets in the Way: Probability Weighting and Underprevention, DISTORTION RISK MEASURES, AMBIGUITY AVERSION AND OPTIMAL EFFORT, The impact of ambiguity and prudence on prevention decisions, Ambiguity aversion, higher-order risk attitude and optimal effort, Who should exert more effort? Risk aversion, downside risk aversion and optimal prevention, On ambiguity apportionment, Insurance bargaining under ambiguity, Revisiting precautionary saving under ambiguity, Comparative ambiguity aversion and downside ambiguity aversion

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