Optimal insurance design under asymmetric Nash bargaining

DOI10.1016/J.INSMATHECO.2024.08.006MaRDI QIDQ6665600zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Yichun Chi, Tao Hu, Zhengtang Zhao, Jiakun Zheng

Publication date 17 January 2025

Published in Insurance Mathematics \& Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.INSMATHECO.2024.08.006

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric Nash bargainingdeductible insuranceoverinsurancerisk sharingwealth effect

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Actuarial mathematics (91G05)

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Cites work

• A noncooperative foundation of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution
• Arrow's theorem on the optimality of deductibles: A stochastic dominance approach
• Insurance bargaining under ambiguity
• Insurance with heterogeneous preferences
• Nash equilibria in optimal reinsurance bargaining
• Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution
• Nonsymmetric Nash solutions and replications of 2-person bargaining
• On the optimality of a straight deductible under belief heterogeneity
• Optimal insurance and generalized deductibles
• Optimal insurance under Wang's premium principle.
• Optimal reinsurance in relation to ordering of risks
• PRICING IN REINSURANCE BARGAINING WITH COMONOTONIC ADDITIVE UTILITY FUNCTIONS
• S-shaped narrow framing, skewness and the demand for insurance
• The bargaining problem
• The economics of risk and time
• The Nash bargaining solution in general \(n\)-person cooperative games
• The Nash bargaining solution vs. equilibrium in a reinsurance syndicate
• Two-person insurance negotiation

Cited in

(3)

• Asymmetric Nash insurance bargaining between risk-averse parties
• Co-opetition in reinsurance markets: when Pareto meets Stackelberg and Nash
• Self-Protection and Insurance Demand with Convex Premium Principles

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