On the redundancy of the implicit welfarist axiom in bargaining theory
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Publication:894044
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.01.017zbMATH Open1330.91105OpenAlexW1997721168WikidataQ114013942 ScholiaQ114013942MaRDI QIDQ894044FDOQ894044
Publication date: 23 November 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.017
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The Bargaining Problem
- Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
- Axiomatic models of bargaining
- Characterization of all individually monotonic bargaining solutions
- On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and Its Extension to Non-Expected Utility Preferences
- Axiomatic bargaining theory on economic environments
- An impossibility result concerning \(n\)-person bargaining games
- A Cardinal Characterization of the Rubinstein-Safra-Thomson Axiomatic Bargaining Theory
- On Nash's hidden assumption
- Appeals immune bargaining solution with variable alternative sets
- Asymmetric Nash Bargaining with Surprised Players
Cited In (5)
- Extension of Monotonic Functions and Representation of Preferences
- On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results
- A Cardinal Characterization of the Rubinstein-Safra-Thomson Axiomatic Bargaining Theory
- A choice-functional characterization of welfarism
- Bargaining on monotonic social choice environments
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