On stable solutions to the ordinal social choice problem

DOI10.1134/S1064562409030375zbMATH Open1175.91062MaRDI QIDQ736038FDOQ736038

Fuad T. Aleskerov, A. N. Subochev

Publication date: 26 October 2009

Published in: Doklady Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Condorcet winnersocial choice\(k\)-stable alternativesweakly stable sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Social choice and individual values
• Condorcet Social Choice Functions
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• A systematic approach to the construction of non-empty choice sets

Cited In (4)

• Experimental and analytic comparison of the accuracy of different estimates of parameters in a linear regression model
• The stability set as a social choice correspondence.
• Modeling optimal social choice: matrix-vector representation of various solution concepts based on majority rule
• On ordered weighted averaging social optima

Recommendations

• Title not available (Why is that?) 👍 👎
• Title not available (Why is that?) 👍 👎
• The solidarity axiom for quasilinear social choice problems 👍 👎
• The ordinal egalitarian bargaining solution for finite choice sets 👍 👎
• On strongly consistent social choice functions 👍 👎
• Ordinal approximation for social choice, matching, and facility location problems given candidate positions 👍 👎
• On ordered weighted averaging social optima 👍 👎
• Level \(r\) consensus and stable social choice 👍 👎
• The ordinal Nash social welfare function 👍 👎

This page was built for publication: On stable solutions to the ordinal social choice problem

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q736038)