On strongly consistent social choice functions

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(93)90021-CzbMATH Open0810.90004OpenAlexW2020477741MaRDI QIDQ687046FDOQ687046

Authors: Vladimir I. Danilov, Aleksandr I. Sotskov 

Publication date: 2 December 1993

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(93)90021-c

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zbMATH Keywords

strong equilibriumeliminable blockingselimination schemestrongly consistent social choice functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• Consistent Voting Systems
• Nonmanipulable Cores
• On strong representations of games by social choice functions
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• On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems

Cited In (13)

• On stable solutions to the ordinal social choice problem
• Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters
• Vetoing in social choice with blockings
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the relative strengths of consistency conditions on choice functions
• Nash consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox.
• Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: Complete characterization
• Reasoning about social choice functions
• Continuity of social choice functions with restricted coalition algebras
• Consistent social choice functions and systems of distinct representatives

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