The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable

DOI10.1007/S003550050164MaRDI QIDQ2386335zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Murat R. Sertel, Bilge Yılmaz

Publication date 22 August 2005

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050164

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cited in

(16)

• Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining
• The majoritarian compromise in large societies
• Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously
• An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation
• Compromise in combinatorial vote
• On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules
• Does majoritarian approval matter in selecting a social choice rule? an exploratory panel study
• Does choosing committees from approval balloting fulfill the electorate's will?
• Approval as an intrinsic part of preference
• Bargaining over a finite set of alternatives
• Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule
• Compromising as an equal loss principle
• A characterization of the maximin rule in the context of voting
• Note on compromise axiom
• Two principles for two-person social choice
• Social acceptability of Condorcet committees

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