Banzhaf index for multiple voting systems. An application to the European Union
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Publication:744681
DOI10.1007/s10479-013-1374-8zbMath1303.91031OpenAlexW1991697505MaRDI QIDQ744681
Luisa Monroy, Francisco Ramón Fernández García
Publication date: 26 September 2014
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-013-1374-8
Related Items (4)
The excess formulations and related results for the normalized Banzhaf index and the Shapley value ⋮ Preference integration and optimization of multistage weighted voting system based on ordinal preference ⋮ Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index ⋮ Coalitional games for networked controllers with constraints on semivalues: a randomized design approach
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