Sharing costs in highways: a game theoretic approach

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2013.01.018MaRDI QIDQ257250zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors J. Kuipers, Manuel A. Mosquera, José M. Zarzuelo

Publication date 15 March 2016

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/11093/1180

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryhighway gamesnucleolusShapley value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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• On the complexity of the highway pricing problem

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3543876 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Computing power indices in weighted multiple majority games.
• Cost Allocation for a Tree Network with Heterogeneous Customers
• Evolutionary Implementation and Congestion Pricing
• Highway games on weakly cyclic graphs
• Highway toll pricing
• How to share railways in infrastructure costs?
• On the computation of the nucleolus of a cooperative game
• Sequencing games
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• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The kernel and bargaining set for convex games
• The kernel/nucleolus of a standard tree game
• The nucleolus of balanced simple flow networks
• Tree-connected peer group situations and peer group games

Cited in

(15)

• Characterizations of highway toll pricing methods
• Strategic interactions of bilateral monopoly on a private highway
• How to share railways in infrastructure costs?
• On how to allocate the fixed cost of transport systems
• Horizontal cooperation in a multimodal public transport system: the profit allocation problem
• An exact decomposition method to save trips in cooperative pickup and delivery based on scheduled trips and profit distribution
• Cost allocation in common facilities sharing
• Cost allocation problems on highways with grouped users
• Approximation of the Shapley value for the Euclidean travelling salesman game
• A non-cooperative mechanism for the Shapley value of airport problems
• The proportional Shapley value and applications
• Schedule situations and their cooperative game theoretic representations
• Subgame-perfection in recursive perfect information games, where each player controls one state
• A bankruptcy approach to solve the fixed cost allocation problem in transport systems
• Subgame perfection in recursive perfect information games

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