Sharing costs in highways: a game theoretic approach
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Publication:257250
DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2013.01.018zbMATH Open1332.91016OpenAlexW1971460267MaRDI QIDQ257250FDOQ257250
Authors: J. Kuipers, Manuel A. Mosquera, José M. Zarzuelo 
Publication date: 15 March 2016
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11093/1180
Recommendations
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Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Cites Work
- A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
- The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
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- Sequencing games
- A characterization of the nucleolus for convex games
- An algorithm for finding the nucleolus of assignment games
- Tree-connected peer group situations and peer group games
- Computing power indices in weighted multiple majority games.
- On the computation of the nucleolus of a cooperative game
- A simple expression for the nucleolus in a special case
- The kernel/nucleolus of a standard tree game
- Highway toll pricing
- The kernel and bargaining set for convex games
- A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
- Strongly essential coalitions and the nucleolus of peer group games
- Highway games on weakly cyclic graphs
- How to share railways in infrastructure costs?
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Computational Complexity of the Game Theory Approach to Cost Allocation for a Tree
- Evolutionary Implementation and Congestion Pricing
- Cost Allocation for a Tree Network with Heterogeneous Customers
- The nucleolus of balanced simple flow networks
Cited In (15)
- Characterizations of highway toll pricing methods
- On how to allocate the fixed cost of transport systems
- A non-cooperative mechanism for the Shapley value of airport problems
- Horizontal cooperation in a multimodal public transport system: the profit allocation problem
- Subgame-perfection in recursive perfect information games, where each player controls one state
- Cost allocation problems on highways with grouped users
- Schedule situations and their cooperative game theoretic representations
- Approximation of the Shapley value for the Euclidean travelling salesman game
- Cost allocation in common facilities sharing
- The proportional Shapley value and applications
- A bankruptcy approach to solve the fixed cost allocation problem in transport systems
- Strategic interactions of bilateral monopoly on a private highway
- An exact decomposition method to save trips in cooperative pickup and delivery based on scheduled trips and profit distribution
- How to share railways in infrastructure costs?
- Subgame perfection in recursive perfect information games
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