A characterization of convex TU games by means of the Mas-Colell bargaining set (à la Shimomura)

DOI10.1007/S00182-011-0291-9zbMath1274.91045OpenAlexW2030361769MaRDI QIDQ422368

Carles Rafels, Josep Maria Izquierdo

Publication date: 16 May 2012

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0291-9

zbMATH Keywords

corebargaining setconvex games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

A note: characterizations of convex games by means of population monotonic allocation schemes ⋮ The core and the steady bargaining set for convex games ⋮ The bargaining set for almost-convex games

Cites Work

• A characterization of convex games by means of bargaining sets
• An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set
• Super-modularity: Applications to convex games and to the greedy algorithm for LP
• Quasi-cores in bargaining sets
• On the cores of cooperative games and the stability of the Weber set
• Equivalence between bargaining sets and the core in simple games
• On the sensitivity of von Neumann and Morgenstern abstract stable sets: The stable and the individual stable bargaining set
• Cores of convex games
• Convex games and stable sets
• An existence theorem for a bargaining set
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• Existence of stable payoff configurations for cooperative games
• Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games

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