A characterization of convex TU games by means of the Mas-Colell bargaining set (à la Shimomura)
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Cites work
- A characterization of convex games by means of bargaining sets
- An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set
- An existence theorem for a bargaining set
- Convex games and stable sets
- Cores of convex games
- Equivalence between bargaining sets and the core in simple games
- Existence of stable payoff configurations for cooperative games
- Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games
- On the cores of cooperative games and the stability of the Weber set
- On the sensitivity of von Neumann and Morgenstern abstract stable sets: The stable and the individual stable bargaining set
- Quasi-cores in bargaining sets
- Super-modularity: Applications to convex games and to the greedy algorithm for LP
- The kernel of a cooperative game
Cited in
(5)- The bargaining set for almost-convex games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4003950 (Why is no real title available?)
- The core and the steady bargaining set for convex games
- A note: characterizations of convex games by means of population monotonic allocation schemes
- A characterization of convex games by means of bargaining sets
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