The unbinding core for coalitional form games

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2021.04.007MaRDI QIDQ2243509zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Takaaki Abe, Yukihiko Funaki

Publication date 11 November 2021

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://www.waseda.jp/fpse/winpec/assets/uploads/2014/05/No.E1805.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

uncertaintycooperative gamecoredeviation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

• Note: Remarks on theory of the core
• The central core and the mid-central core as novel set-valued and point-valued solution concepts for transferable utility coalitional games
• Undominated nonnegative excesses and core extensions of transferable utility games
• The core and consistency properties: A general characterisation
• Deviations, uncertainty and the core

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
• A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game
• Credible coalitions and the core
• Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games
• On Kakutani's fixed point theorem, the K-K-M-S theorem and the core of a balanced game
• On cores and indivisibility
• On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods
• The Core of an N Person Game

Cited in

(2)

• Goal-directed Unbounded Coalitional Game and Its Complexity
• Core in a simple coalition formation game

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