The unbinding core for coalitional form games
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The authors introduce a new core concept called the unbinding core by extending the definition of a deviation. In the traditional definition, players deviate if a profitable allocation exists after their deviation, while the new definition requires that all possible allocations are profitable. Therefore, the unbinding core becomes a superset of the traditional core. They examine some properties of the unbinding core; in particular, a sufficient condition for the unbinding core to be nonempty is provided.
Recommendations
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Cites work
- A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game
- Credible coalitions and the core
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
- Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games
- On cores and indivisibility
- On Kakutani's fixed point theorem, the K-K-M-S theorem and the core of a balanced game
- On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods
- The Core of an N Person Game
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