On the computation of stability in multiple coalition formation games

DOI10.1007/s10614-006-9047-1zbMath1151.91348OpenAlexW2030803566MaRDI QIDQ862836

Niels J. Olieman, M. Elena Sáiz, Eligius M. T. Hendrix

Publication date: 24 January 2007

Published in: Computational Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10614-006-9047-1

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitygame theoryenvironmentimplementationcoalition formation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (5)

Coalition fuzzy stability analysis in the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution ⋮ Largest consistent set in international environmental agreements ⋮ Set-theoretic inequalities in stochastic noncooperative games with coalition ⋮ Methods for computing Nash equilibria of a location-quantity game ⋮ International environmental agreements with asymmetric countries

Cites Work

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• Stability likelihood of coalitions in a two-stage cartel game: an estimation method
• A theory of endogenous coalition structures
• Equilibrium binding agreements
• Stable coalition structures with externalities
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• COALITION FORMATION IN A GLOBAL WARMING GAME: HOW THE DESIGN OF PROTOCOLS AFFECTS THE SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING

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