On the computation of stability in multiple coalition formation games
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Publication:862836
DOI10.1007/S10614-006-9047-1zbMATH Open1151.91348OpenAlexW2030803566MaRDI QIDQ862836FDOQ862836
Authors: M. Elena Sáiz, E. M. T. Hendrix, Niels J. Olieman 
Publication date: 24 January 2007
Published in: Computational Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10614-006-9047-1
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Cites Work
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- COALITION FORMATION IN A GLOBAL WARMING GAME: HOW THE DESIGN OF PROTOCOLS AFFECTS THE SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING
- Stability likelihood of coalitions in a two-stage cartel game: an estimation method
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Cited In (18)
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- Simulating a sequential coalition formation process for the climate change problem: first come, but second served?
- Coalition fuzzy stability analysis in the graph model for conflict resolution
- An axiomatic characterization of coalitionally stable solutions for the games in normal form
- Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem
- A coalitional game-theoretic model of stable government forms with umpires
- An algorithm for computing the stable coalition structures in tree-graph communication games
- Set-theoretic inequalities in stochastic noncooperative games with coalition
- A polyhedral approach to the stability of a family of coalitions
- Membership rules and stability of coalition structures in positive externality games
- Coalitional stability conditions in multicriteria dynamic games
- Largest consistent set in international environmental agreements
- On the secession-stability of Nash equilibria in a model of endogenous coalition formation
- Methods for computing Nash equilibria of a location-quantity game
- Designing stable coalition structures for international environmental agreements
- COALITION FORMATION IN A GLOBAL WARMING GAME: HOW THE DESIGN OF PROTOCOLS AFFECTS THE SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- International environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
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