Stability likelihood of coalitions in a two-stage cartel game: an estimation method
DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2005.01.040zbMATH Open1116.90056OpenAlexW2097907313MaRDI QIDQ858367FDOQ858367
E. M. T. Hendrix, Niels J. Olieman
Publication date: 9 January 2007
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2005.01.040
game theoryuncertainty modellingmultivariate statisticsenvironmentrobustness and sensitivity analysis
Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Sensitivity, stability, parametric optimization (90C31) Decision theory for games (91A35)
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- COALITION FORMATION IN A GLOBAL WARMING GAME: HOW THE DESIGN OF PROTOCOLS AFFECTS THE SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING
Cited In (3)
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