COALITION FORMATION IN A GLOBAL WARMING GAME: HOW THE DESIGN OF PROTOCOLS AFFECTS THE SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING
DOI10.1111/J.1939-7445.2006.TB00184.XzbMATH Open1159.91331OpenAlexW2112460930MaRDI QIDQ3616618FDOQ3616618
Publication date: 26 March 2009
Published in: Natural Resource Modeling (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://feb.kuleuven.be/drc/Economics/misc/ete_workingpapers/ete-wp-2003-17.pdf
Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Noncooperative games (91A10)
Cites Work
- International pollution control: Cooperative versus noncooperative strategies
- The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
- Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
- Equilibrium binding agreements
- Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control
- Stable coalition structures with externalities
- A COALITION APPROACH TO THE MANAGEMENT OF HIGH SEAS FISHERIES IN THE PRESENCE OF EXTERNALITIES
- Climate coalitions in an integrated assessment model
Cited In (12)
- Simulating a sequential coalition formation process for the climate change problem: first come, but second served?
- Can international environmental cooperation be bought: comment
- Stability likelihood of coalitions in a two-stage cartel game: an estimation method
- Models of Endogenous Coalition Formation Between Fiscal and Monetary Authorities in the Presence of a Monetary Union
- On the computation of stability in multiple coalition formation games
- Membership rules and stability of coalition structures in positive externality games
- How crucial is cooperation in mitigating world climate? Analysis with World-MARKAL
- Likelihood of environmental coalitions and the number of coalition members: evidences from an IAM model
- The effects of R\&D investments in international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
- International environmental agreements with developed and developing countries in a dynamic approach
- Sharing R\&D investments in international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
- International environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
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