COALITION FORMATION IN A GLOBAL WARMING GAME: HOW THE DESIGN OF PROTOCOLS AFFECTS THE SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING
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Publication:3616618
Recommendations
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Cites work
- A COALITION APPROACH TO THE MANAGEMENT OF HIGH SEAS FISHERIES IN THE PRESENCE OF EXTERNALITIES
- Climate coalitions in an integrated assessment model
- Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
- Equilibrium binding agreements
- International pollution control: Cooperative versus noncooperative strategies
- Stable coalition structures with externalities
- The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
- Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control
Cited in
(14)- International environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
- Can international environmental cooperation be bought: comment
- Regional versus global cooperation for climate control
- International environmental agreements with developed and developing countries in a dynamic approach
- Models of endogenous coalition formation between fiscal and monetary authorities in the presence of a monetary union
- Sharing R\&D investments in international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
- How crucial is cooperation in mitigating world climate? Analysis with World-MARKAL
- Stability likelihood of coalitions in a two-stage cartel game: an estimation method
- Designing stable coalition structures for international environmental agreements
- On the computation of stability in multiple coalition formation games
- Likelihood of environmental coalitions and the number of coalition members: evidences from an IAM model
- Simulating a sequential coalition formation process for the climate change problem: first come, but second served?
- Membership rules and stability of coalition structures in positive externality games
- The effects of R\&D investments in international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
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