A COALITION APPROACH TO THE MANAGEMENT OF HIGH SEAS FISHERIES IN THE PRESENCE OF EXTERNALITIES

DOI10.1111/j.1939-7445.2003.tb00109.xzbMath1058.91010OpenAlexW2098725440MaRDI QIDQ4434349

Pedro Pintassilgo

Publication date: 2003

Published in: Natural Resource Modeling (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://math.la.asu.edu/~rmmc/nrm/Vol16-2/PIN/PIN.html

zbMATH Keywords

partition functioncooperative agreementbluefin tuner

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cites Work

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• The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• An open-access analysis of the northern anchovy fishery
• SHARING THE BENEFITS OF COOPERATION IN HIGH SEAS FISHERIES: A CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION GAME APPROACH
• Two-Person Cooperative Games