A COALITION APPROACH TO THE MANAGEMENT OF HIGH SEAS FISHERIES IN THE PRESENCE OF EXTERNALITIES
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4434349
DOI10.1111/j.1939-7445.2003.tb00109.xzbMath1058.91010OpenAlexW2098725440MaRDI QIDQ4434349
Publication date: 2003
Published in: Natural Resource Modeling (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://math.la.asu.edu/~rmmc/nrm/Vol16-2/PIN/PIN.html
Cooperative games (91A12) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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- Two-Person Cooperative Games