Sustainable coalitions in the commons
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Publication:419415
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2011.10.006zbMath1237.91172OpenAlexW2052070798MaRDI QIDQ419415
Jean-Christophe Péreau, Luc Doyen
Publication date: 18 May 2012
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://cahiersdugretha.u-bordeaux.fr/2009/2009-15.pdf
Related Items (6)
Maximin, viability and sustainability ⋮ The tragedy of open ecosystems ⋮ Ecological-economic modelling for the sustainable management of biodiversity ⋮ Computation of viability kernels: a case study of by-catch fisheries ⋮ Stochastic differential game for management of non-renewable fishery resource under model ambiguity ⋮ Differential Game Model for Sustainability Multi-Fishery
Cites Work
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- Dynamic Cournot-competitive harvesting of a common pool resource
- Stable coalition structures with externalities
- Community enforcement of fisheries effort restrictions.
- Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
- GAME-THEORETIC RESOURCE MODELING
- COALITION FORMATION IN STRADDLING STOCK FISHERIES: A PARTITION FUNCTION APPROACH
- SHARING THE BENEFITS OF COOPERATION IN HIGH SEAS FISHERIES: A CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION GAME APPROACH
- A COALITION APPROACH TO THE MANAGEMENT OF HIGH SEAS FISHERIES IN THE PRESENCE OF EXTERNALITIES
- SHARING THE BENEFITS OF COOPERATION IN THE NORWEGIAN SPRING-SPAWNING HERRING FISHERY
- Differential Games Through Viability Theory: Old and Recent Results
- RESTRICTED COALITIONS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF REGIONAL FISHERIES ORGANIZATIONS
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