RESTRICTED COALITIONS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF REGIONAL FISHERIES ORGANIZATIONS
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Publication:5697253
DOI10.1111/j.1939-7445.2004.tb00128.xzbMath1138.91569OpenAlexW2093836031MaRDI QIDQ5697253
Publication date: 17 October 2005
Published in: Natural Resource Modeling (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1939-7445.2004.tb00128.x
Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)
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- THE CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF HIGH SEAS FISHERY RESOURCES UNDER THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA
- DYNAMIC COOPERATIVE GAMES
- SHARING THE BENEFITS OF COOPERATION IN THE NORWEGIAN SPRING-SPAWNING HERRING FISHERY