COALITION FORMATION IN STRADDLING STOCK FISHERIES: A PARTITION FUNCTION APPROACH
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Publication:3618903
DOI10.1142/S0219198908001959zbMath1157.91309WikidataQ58884572 ScholiaQ58884572MaRDI QIDQ3618903
Pedro Pintassilgo, Marko Lindroos
Publication date: 3 April 2009
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198908001959
91A12: Cooperative games
91A40: Other game-theoretic models
91B76: Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.)
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Sustainable coalitions in the commons, Coalition formation in collaborative production and transportation with competing firms, PLANNING MARINE PROTECTED AREAS: A MULTIPLE USE GAME, DOES GAME THEORY HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY IN POLICY MAKING IN NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT?
Uses Software
Cites Work
- International fish wars: The strategic roles for fleet licensing and effort subsidies
- Equilibria in a stochastic resource management game under imperfect information
- Stable coalition structures with externalities
- FISH WARS ON THE HIGH SEAS: A STRADDLING STOCK COMPETITION MODEL
- A COALITION APPROACH TO THE MANAGEMENT OF HIGH SEAS FISHERIES IN THE PRESENCE OF EXTERNALITIES
- REGIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT ON THE HIGH SEAS: THE HIT-AND-RUN INTERLOPER MODEL
- SHARING THE BENEFITS OF COOPERATION IN THE NORWEGIAN SPRING-SPAWNING HERRING FISHERY