COALITION FORMATION IN STRADDLING STOCK FISHERIES: A PARTITION FUNCTION APPROACH

DOI10.1142/S0219198908001959zbMath1157.91309WikidataQ58884572 ScholiaQ58884572MaRDI QIDQ3618903

Pedro Pintassilgo, Marko Lindroos

Publication date: 3 April 2009

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198908001959

zbMATH Keywords

partition function; coalition; externalities; bioeconomic model; straddling fish stock

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91A40: Other game-theoretic models

91B76: Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.)

Related Items

Sustainable coalitions in the commons, Coalition formation in collaborative production and transportation with competing firms, PLANNING MARINE PROTECTED AREAS: A MULTIPLE USE GAME, DOES GAME THEORY HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY IN POLICY MAKING IN NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT?

Uses Software

• AEGIS

Cites Work

• International fish wars: The strategic roles for fleet licensing and effort subsidies
• Equilibria in a stochastic resource management game under imperfect information
• Stable coalition structures with externalities
• FISH WARS ON THE HIGH SEAS: A STRADDLING STOCK COMPETITION MODEL
• A COALITION APPROACH TO THE MANAGEMENT OF HIGH SEAS FISHERIES IN THE PRESENCE OF EXTERNALITIES
• REGIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT ON THE HIGH SEAS: THE HIT-AND-RUN INTERLOPER MODEL
• SHARING THE BENEFITS OF COOPERATION IN THE NORWEGIAN SPRING-SPAWNING HERRING FISHERY