Simulating a sequential coalition formation process for the climate change problem: first come, but second served?
DOI10.1007/S10479-010-0815-XzbMATH Open1301.91034OpenAlexW2105520423MaRDI QIDQ475281FDOQ475281
Authors: Michael Finus, Bianca Rundshagen, Johan Eyckmans 
Publication date: 26 November 2014
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://opus.bath.ac.uk/28547/1/SMUG_v01102010_final_submission.pdf
Recommendations
- Reevaluation and renegotiation of climate change coalitions-a sequential closed-loop game approach
- Sequential formation of coalitions through bilateral agreements in a Cournot setting
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- On the computation of stability in multiple coalition formation games
- Game theoretic models for climate change negotiations
Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)
Cites Work
- Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
- Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
- Stable international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant, uncertainty and learning
- An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements
- Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries
- PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF TIMING AND REGULATION
- A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
- COALITION FORMATION IN A GLOBAL WARMING GAME: HOW THE DESIGN OF PROTOCOLS AFFECTS THE SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING
- A Social Coalitional Equilibrium Existence Lemma
- Decomposing the integrated assessment of climate change
Cited In (5)
- Impact of equity and equality on stability and collusion in a decentralized network
- Reevaluation and renegotiation of climate change coalitions-a sequential closed-loop game approach
- Likelihood of environmental coalitions and the number of coalition members: evidences from an IAM model
- Solution algorithms for regional interactions in large-scale integrated assessment models of climate change
- Who pays the bill? Climate change, taxes, and transfers in a multi-region growth model
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