Simulating a sequential coalition formation process for the climate change problem: first come, but second served?
DOI10.1007/S10479-010-0815-XzbMath1301.91034OpenAlexW2105520423MaRDI QIDQ475281
Michael Finus, Bianca Rundshagen, Johan Eyckmans
Publication date: 26 November 2014
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://opus.bath.ac.uk/28547/1/SMUG_v01102010_final_submission.pdf
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
Related Items (4)
Cites Work
- Decomposing the integrated assessment of climate change
- The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
- Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
- Stable international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant, uncertainty and learning
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- COALITION FORMATION IN A GLOBAL WARMING GAME: HOW THE DESIGN OF PROTOCOLS AFFECTS THE SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING
- PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF TIMING AND REGULATION
- A Social Coalitional Equilibrium Existence Lemma
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
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