The existence of a unique core partition in coalition formation games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2019.01.009zbMath1419.91045OpenAlexW2914835476WikidataQ128411299 ScholiaQ128411299MaRDI QIDQ1735811

Hakan İnal

Publication date: 29 March 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.01.009

zbMATH Keywords

algorithmstabilitymatchingcorecoalition formation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (1)

Generating Empirical Core Size Distributions of Hedonic Games Using a Monte Carlo Method

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