Random marginal and random removal values
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Publication:999119
DOI10.1007/s00182-008-0132-7zbMath1229.91025MaRDI QIDQ999119
Publication date: 30 January 2009
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0132-7
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