Random marginal and random removal values
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Publication:999119
DOI10.1007/S00182-008-0132-7zbMATH Open1229.91025OpenAlexW2104614197MaRDI QIDQ999119FDOQ999119
Authors: Emilio Calvo
Publication date: 30 January 2009
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0132-7
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Cites Work
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Cited In (16)
- Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value
- Modeling values for TU-games using generalized versions of consistency, standardness and the null player property
- Randomly removing \(g\) handles at once
- A cooperative value in a multiplicative model
- Axiomatic characterizations of the egalitarian solidarity values
- Axiomatic characterizations of the weighted solidarity values
- Recursive and bargaining values
- The Shapley-solidarity value for games with a coalition structure
- Secession and value
- Bargaining delay under partial breakdowns and externalities
- On a new method of analyzing properties of efficient, symmetric and linear values of TU-games
- Nash bargaining solution under externalities
- Group contributions in TU-games: a class of \(k\)-lateral Shapley values
- A-potential function and a non-cooperative foundation for the solidarity value
- The grand surplus value and repeated cooperative cross-games with coalitional collaboration
- The burning coalition bargaining model
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