A Shapley-based Groves mechanism: when the mechanism designer plays the \textit{wise man}

DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2019.09.010MaRDI QIDQ2294380zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Michela Chessa

Publication date 10 February 2020

Published in Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2019.09.010

zbMATH Keywords

budget-balancedmechanism designpotentialShapley value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• A new characterization of the Groves-Clarke mechanism
• Generalized Groves-Ledyard mechanisms
• Is Shapley cost sharing optimal?
• Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
• Undominated Groves mechanisms

Cites work

• Bargaining and Value
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Generating functions for computing power indices efficiently
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4164592 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentives in Teams
• The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

Cited in

(1)

• A new characterization of the Groves-Clarke mechanism

This page was built for publication: A Shapley-based Groves mechanism: when the mechanism designer plays the \textit{wise man}

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2294380)