A Shapley-based Groves mechanism: when the mechanism designer plays the \textit{wise man}

DOI10.1016/j.orl.2019.09.010zbMath1476.91068OpenAlexW2975982325MaRDI QIDQ2294380

Michela Chessa

Publication date: 10 February 2020

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2019.09.010

zbMATH Keywords

potentialShapley valuemechanism designbudget-balanced

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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