Too big to prevail: the paradox of power in coalition formation

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2022.04.006MaRDI QIDQ2675460zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Changxia Ke, Florian Morath, Anthony Newell, Lionel Page

Publication date 23 September 2022

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.04.006

zbMATH Keywords

(non) binding agreementbalance of powercommunicationShapley value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Experimental studies (91A90)

Recommendations

• Power, Embedded Games, and Coalition Formation
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Cites work

• A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation.
• Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers
• Coalition Formation in Non-Democracies
• Elections, governments, and parliaments in proportional representation systems
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1470897 (Why is no real title available?)
• Multilinear Extensions of Games

Cited in

(2)

• Power, Embedded Games, and Coalition Formation
• The influence of large coalitions

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Uses Software

• oTree

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