A methodological note on a weighted voting experiment

DOI10.1007/S00355-014-0814-YMaRDI QIDQ485426zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Eric Guerci, Nobuyuki Hanaki, Naoki Watanabe, G. Esposito, Xiaoyan Lu

Publication date 9 January 2015

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://tsukuba.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/32059/files/SCW_43-4.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Experimental studies (91A90) Voting theory (91B12)

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• A new index of power for simple n-person games
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• Veto power in committees: An experimental study

Cited in

(6)

• Meaningful learning in weighted voting games: an experiment
• Two field experiments on approval voting in Germany
• Correction to: ``Weighted scoring elections: is Borda best?
• Gender and nominal power in multilateral bargaining
• Laboratory Experiments on Approval Voting
• An experiment on the Nash program: a comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value

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Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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