Gender and nominal power in multilateral bargaining

DOI10.3390/g13010011zbMath1484.91104OpenAlexW4205259189MaRDI QIDQ2669165

Fabian Paetzel, Stefan Traub, Nicola Friederike Maaser

Publication date: 9 March 2022

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g13010011

zbMATH Keywords

bargaininglaboratory experimentgender differences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• A methodological note on a weighted voting experiment
• Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence
• On the validity of the random lottery incentive system
• Luxembourg in the early days of the EEC: null player or not?
• Meaningful learning in weighted voting games: an experiment
• Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: an experimental analysis
• Which is the Fair Sex? Gender Differences in Altruism

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