Dominance invariant one-to-one matching problems
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Publication:480857
DOI10.1007/s00182-014-0411-4zbMath1304.91024OpenAlexW2145088518MaRDI QIDQ480857
Vincent J. Vannetelbosch, Ana Mauleon, Elena Molis, Wouter Vergote
Publication date: 12 December 2014
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/core/documents/coredp2013_52web.pdf
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