Far-sightedness and the voting paradox
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Publication:1289260
DOI10.1006/jeth.1998.2466zbMath0919.90148MaRDI QIDQ1289260
Publication date: 27 May 1999
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2466
Related Items
A core of voting games with improved foresight, Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets, Cooperation, stability and social welfare under majority rule, Coalitional stability with a credibility constraint, The stability set as a social choice correspondence., SOCIAL CHOICE AND COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY: VOTING GAMES AS SOCIAL AGGREGATION FUNCTIONS
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- A consistent bargaining set
- Stability of decision systems under majority rule
- Farsighted coalitional stability
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- A Note about the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule