Far-sightedness and the voting paradox

DOI10.1006/JETH.1998.2466MaRDI QIDQ1289260zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bhaskar Chakravorti

Publication date 27 May 1999

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2466

zbMATH Keywords

consistently far-sighted votingstability setvoting games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets
• A core of voting games with improved foresight
• Stability of voting games
• A theory of farsightedness in committee games

Cites work

• A consistent bargaining set
• A Note about the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Credible coalitions and the core
• Farsighted coalitional stability
• Non-collegial simple games and the nowhere denseness of the set of preference profiles having a core
• On the core of voting games
• Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets
• Stability of decision systems under majority rule
• The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results

Cited in

(7)

• Coalitional stability with a credibility constraint
• The stability set as a social choice correspondence.
• Social choice and cooperative game theory: voting games as social aggregation functions
• Optimal Electoral Timing: Exercise Wisely and You May Live Longer
• A core of voting games with improved foresight
• Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets
• Cooperation, stability and social welfare under majority rule

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