Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the Technion
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
- Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
- Some remarks on the stable matching problem
- Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
- The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
Cited in
(7)- Stable matching of student-groups to dormitories
- A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the Technion
- A planner-optimal matching mechanism and its incentive compatibility in a restricted domain
- The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules
- College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized
- Stability and strategy-proofness for college admissions with an eligibility criterion
- Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
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