Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion
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Publication:532764
DOI10.1007/s00182-009-0210-5zbMath1211.91180OpenAlexW2017584848MaRDI QIDQ532764
Nitsan Perach, Uriel G. Rothblum
Publication date: 5 May 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0210-5
Related Items (3)
Stable matching of student-groups to dormitories ⋮ Stability and strategy-proofness for college admissions with an eligibility criterion ⋮ College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized
Cites Work
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- Some remarks on the stable matching problem
- A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the Technion
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
- Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
- The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
- Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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